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. ln 
This paper is a work in progress exercise, delivered at the Euromed's La 
Navigation du Savoir encounter at St James Cavalier, (Valletta in 2004) 
which may be extended and revised in due course l . An upgraded version 
would comprise more specific comparative references to Malta and 
Gibraltar both in the context of British naval policies and assessments, 
especially working and living conditions prevailing during the inter-war 
period relating to dockyard employment and otherwise2, as well as the 
earlier Maltese migratory movement and settlement before and especially 
after the building of the Suez Canal, including aspects of cultural clash, 
ethnicity, crime and possible scapegoating, all of which have continued 
to some extent to reverberate in a collective memory, in spite of the 
gradual assimilation3. 
1. (Its preparation was caught in between two public lectures, one at the Istituto 
Italiano di Cultura, Valletta, on Cristoforo Columbo, recalling the significance 
of his navigational feat in 1492, and the other on M.A. Vassalli, U father of 
the Maltese language", who died in 1829, at Sant' Anton Palace, Attard.) 
2. See e.g. the extensive report on "Gibraltar Living Conditions", Adm 116/ 
4994, ft. 1-67, for the mid-1930s. 
3. See e.g. the 19th Gibraltar censuses data (many thanks to a Gibraltarian research 
assistant Kelly Frendo) as well as exchanges of correspondence between this 
writer and various Gibraltarian researchers, including Tom Finlayson, and 
residents, including Charles Rosado. With regard to the still simmering British-
Spanish negotiations about Gibraltar, there was an intervention in the House 
of Lords on 14 May 2002 by Lord Wallace of Saltaire, partly inspired by an 
observation in my paper at the Calpe conference in Gibraltar (infra), enc. 
Wallace/Frendo, 5 July 2002. The archival reference to the Young Liberals, 
infra, ftn. 22 and see below pp. 28-29, was somewhat hilarious because, as 
it happened, one of their former leaders, Peter Hain, was entrusted with 
the seemingly ever-stalemated British-Spanish negotiations over Gibraltar 
in 2004. 
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Actually this is a follow-up to a still unpublished keynote address 
which I had delivered at a conference which I had co-organized in 
Gibraltar, under the auspices of the Gibraltar Museum in September 
2002, on the subject: "Gibraltar-Malta: History, Heritage and Identity 
in a Mediterranean Setting". My knowledge and understanding of the 
Gibraltarian situation was much enhanced by that delightful socio-
historical experience, so I shall briefly refer here to an additional intended 
input to this tour d'horizon, inviting more specialised and detailed 
attention to various sinews in the thread, some of which I certainly hope 
to engage in myself more fully in the coming months. They complement 
my long-standing interest not only in migrant settlement but in imperial 
strategy, and the impact of these on islands and enclaves, particularly in 
the Mediterranean region 4 • 
Among our speakers in Gibraltar we were privileged to have scholars 
such as David Lowenthal who, with landscape and heritage mainly in 
mind, asked whether smallness could sustain survival; and David 
Abulafia, who spoke about Atlantic expansion and Mediterranean 
4. See e.g. H. Frendo, "Malta, Cyprus and Gibraltar: Self Identity in Small States", 
in G. W. Trompf, ed., Islands and Enclaves: Nationalisms and Separatist Pressures 
in Island and Littoral Contexts (New Delhi: Sterling, 1993), 13-30; "The Legacy 
of Colonialism: The Experience of Malta and Cyprus", in D. G. Lockhart; D. 
Drakakis-Smith & J. Schembri eds, The Development Process in Small Island 
States (Routledge), (London & New York, 1993), 151-160; "The Naughty Eu-
ropean Twins of Empire: The Constitutional Breakdown in Malta and Cyprus 
1930-1933", The European Legacy, 3: 1 (1998),45-52; "Ilhna tal-Maltin fid-Dinja: 
X'Futur hemm ghal rabtiet ta' kultura hajja u identita etnika?", in G. N. Busuttil 
and V. Pace, eds, Proceedings and Report: Convention of Leaders of Associations 
of Maltese Abroad and of Maltese Origins (Valletta: Emigrants Commission; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs & UNDP, 2000), 119-132; "Is-Silta tan-NiseI: Maltin fid-
Diaspora u l-Identita Etnika", in D. Massa, ed., Malta: Esplorazzjoni (Univ. of 
Malta, 2001), 34-47. On newspaper articles and chapters relating to the migrant 
experience, see the list in C. Farrugia, ed., Old Roots - New Horizons: The History 
of Maltese Emigration (Friends of the National Archives of Malta, 2001), 20L 
including i.a. H. Frendo, "Maltin ta' Tunes" between the Wars: An Interview 
with Edgar Pisani", The Sunday Times, 26 November 1995, 32-33; Malta 1-
Ohra", Il-Mumwt, 30 January 2000, 20-21; "The Pull of the Homeland" (an 
interview with the author by Gillian Bartolo), The Malta Independent on Sunday, 
16 January 2000, 15; "Maltese Settlers in the Ionian Islands", The Sunday Times, 
11 February 2001, 48-49 ; ibid., 18 February 2001, 42-43; "The Maltese of French 
North Africa", ibid., 1 July 2001, 48-49. 
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decline: in other words, about the Mediterranean before the period 
that most interests us, from the 18th century onwards. This immersion 
into Gibraltar's little and peculiar real world was, to me, extremely 
valuable because it brought me into personal contact for the first time 
with a few Gibraltarian archivists and historians, and to some extent, 
mainly through the help of a Gibraltarian research assistant, with the 
Gibraltarian archives. A comparative examination of the Gibraltar census 
returns shows, for example, that from the mid-19 th century until the 
beginning of the 20 t \ of the sizeable Malta-descended population of 
Gibraltar, most worked as coal-heavers, for whom a special call for 
applications had been circulated, while a noteworthy number worked 
as boatmen and "bum-boatmen" in and around the harbour. But as 
the Bishop of Gibraltar (who is himself the author of a book about 
it) confided to me, he himself is a direct descendant of a Maltese migrant 
who had settled in Gibraltar with several other Maltese after works on 
the Suez Canal had been completed. His name is Charles Caruana5 -
no relation to the chief minister, Peter Caruana, whose deputy has 
long been another Maltese-descended lawyer, Keith Azzopard{ 
The archivists include Tom Finlayson and Denis Beiso; but also 
Richard Garcia, whose paper on the rise of a merchant community 
in Gibraltar in the early 19th century makes for interesting comparison 
with what was happening in Malta, as has been shown by, for example, 
Michela d'Angelo of Messina, particularly during the Continental 
5. See his book The Rock under a Cloud (Cambridge: Silent Books, 1989), including 
the sometimes controversial Church involvement in trying to improve the workers' 
lot in and after the 1870s - especially in reltation to overcrowding and bad 
housing, scarce sanitary facilities, under-paid labour. Maltese were among such 
workers, including boatmen, coal-heavers, porters, stevedores, muleteers, to-
bacco-choppers, cigar-makers. "There were of course other workers", Caruana 
writes, such as those who constructed the dockyard - this group consisted of 
convict labour as well as Maltese, Portugese, and Spanish labourers. These 
people had no tradition of forming associations for achieving workers" secu-
rity. When in dire straits, all they could do was rely on the St Vincent de Paule 
Conferences or the Freemasons "Lodges for relief". Ibid., 114-115. 
6. Peter Caruana won re-election and continues as Chief Minister of Gibraltar to 
this day. In this capacity he attended the Commonwealth Heads of Govern-
ment Meeting (CHOGM) in Malta in November 2005. Keith Azzopardi no 
longer serves as deputy. 
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Blockade. One other relevant source of record is The GibraLtar Chronicle, 
a publication of truly venerable age in the history of journalism, a subject 
taken up by Diana Sloma. 
Finally, another speaker was Larry Sawchhuk, of Toronto University, 
who now has established himself as leading socio-medical historian of 
Gibraltar, increasingly with an interest in comparisons with Malta, an 
interest in which I have been cooperating with him for some years. I am 
pleased to say that in 2004 one of his post-graduate students was in Malta 
furthering comparative studies in this field; this continued in July 2006 
during their participation in the 10rh world congress of the International 
Society for the Study of European Ideas, which I convened, on "The 
European Mind: Narrative and Identity". Here, too, comparisons abound, 
as in the spread of epidemics by sea vessels, although infant mortality in 
Gibraltar for various reasons was lower than in Malta until the 1950s. 
Sawchuck has also referred to some rather negative attitudes to typically 
poor, less educated Maltese migrant settlers in Gibraltar in the second 
half of the 19rh century; while Finlayson gave an account of them which 
I felt to be partly an exercise in scapegoating and which he has since 
revised by looking again, more critically, at crime statistics, and especially 
at the nature of the "crimes" as reported the practice of grazing animals 
on the front lawn being obviously a rather different "crime" than murder, 
even if listed under the same heading. 
In spite of the apparent misleading smallness, therefore, we have 
before us a vast canvas on which to paint many pictures about these 
two places, which were, as to a greater or lesser extent they remain, 
geographically, socially and politically harbour-centred human 
settlements. Plans we had in hand to have a special edition of our 
JournaL of Mediterranean Studies, successfully published for many years 
now by our Mediterranean Institute here, with several of these 
contributions, did not materialise for reasons beyond my control, but 
there is great scope for further cooperation among "European 
Mediterranean" researchers and scholars in this area? 
7. Among the Gibraltarian researchers who addressed this conference there were 
Geraldine Finlayson, a cultural research officer who directs the John Mackintosh 
Hall, Gibraltar, who tackled The Rock's "history of civilizations past"; Denis 
Besio, then Archivist Designate who has since taken over the Gibraltar Archives, 
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Since the Gibraltar experience, one book to which I wish to draw 
specific attention, and with which some participants here may be 
familiar, is that put together by Elizabetta Tonizzi, published by Franco 
Angeli in Milan in 2002, in the series "Memoria e Ricerca" of the 
Rivista di storia contemporanea. It is aptly called: Porti dellEuropa 
mediterranea (secoli XIX e XX) and includes chapters by Gelina Harlaftis 
on "Storia marittima e storia dei porti"; by Tonizzi herself on the port 
of Genoa from 1861 to 1970; Paolo Frascani on Napoli, 1860-1960; 
Samuel Fettah on Marseille during the 18rh and 19rh century; Albert 
Carreras and Cesar Yanez on Barcelona; and Vassias Tsokopoulos on 
Piraeus from 1835 onwards. In addition, this excellent publication 
contains some historiographical reflections relating to colonialism, 
European expansion southwards, universalistic aspirations and the for-
mation of national identity in Europe, as well as to the media-related 
transformation concept of "intermedialidt" in history. 
A forthcoming and also relevant work, being published under the 
direction of Professor Marta Petricioli et al. by the Universita di Studi 
speaking about "The Foundations of Modern Gibraltarian History" from 1704 
to 1969; Richard Garcia, Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Tourism and 
Transport, who addressed the rise of a merchant community in Gibraltar in 
the early 19th century as an example of opportunism; Dr John Cortes, a bota-
nist who spoke of nature conservation. We had Diane Sloama's paper about 
the influence of The Gibraltar Chronicle on the Gibraltarian outlook; Professor 
Clive Finlayson on "scale in heritage" with reference also to archaeology; and 
two contributions by the outgoing archivist Tom Finlayson, one on "the 
Gibraltarians" since 1704, and another entitled: "Gibraltar: Military Fortress 
or Commercial Colony?" Other pertinent interventions on the side of the hosts 
were those by The Hon. Keith Azzopardi, Deputy Chief Minister; Cdr Joe 
Ballantine of the Gibraltar Heritage Trust; and The Hon. Bernard Linares, 
Minister for Education and Culture. In addition to my keynote, originally 
entitled "European Mediterranean identities: Spain, Italy and Britain in the 
Gibraltar-Malta Nexus", other Maltese speakers included Nathaniel Cutajar 
(archaeology), Step hen Spiteri (fortifications), Tony Pace (heritage, identity 
and the problems of being small), Mario Farrugia (the lOO-ton Armstrong gun, 
identical to the one in Malta, which was also tested during our stay), Dr Vicki 
Anne Cremona (now Malta's ambassador to France) on theatricality; and Professor 
Joe Brincat on historical strata in the Maltese language. Dr Beiso, now Gibraltar's 
archivist, will be participating in my workshop on "Empire and Nation in the 
Mediterranean" in the above-mentioned ISSEI world congress (University of 
Malta, July 2006). 
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di Firenze next year, will be Mediterranean Europe (L'Europa 
Mediterraneana), these being the proceedings of a conference we had in 
Firenze in September 2004 in the series Temps et Espaces de I'EuropeB• 
Here I shall try to address myself briefly, mainly historically, to some 
of the issues at hand relating to Mediterranean fortresses, ports and 
peoples, with special reference to a Gibraltar-Malta nexus, highlighting 
some aspects of what is the more native and distinct, if similar and 
comparable, in the Mediterranean context between Europe and Empire. 
Britain's acquisition of Gibraltar from Spain in 1704, and its 
subsequent conditional ratification by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, was 
a prelude to the creation of three imperial Mediterranean networks in 
modern times. After Gibraltar, Britain came to possess Malta during the 
Napoleonic era, an acquisition once again only ratified by international 
treaty several years after it had actually occurred, in 1814, when Britain 
also appropriated the Ionian Islands. 
Further to the east, Britain went on to take hold of Cyprus in 1878, 
at the Congress of Berlin. Four years later, as we know, Britain took Egypt 
to the south, by far its largest territory with a Mediterranean coastline, 
thus counter-balancing the French regional presence, which had by now 
established itself in Algeria and Tunisia. By this time, however, Britain 
already had overriding control over the Suez Canal and its surrounding 
zone, which meant that through "her" ports and outposts she was really, 
both militarily and commercially, strategic mistress of the Mediterranean 
sea lanes and trade routes - as well as the ruler of the colonial subjects 
ashore. Cooperation with France in the 20th century, mainly as a result 
of German competition, expansion and rivalry, did not seriously dent this 
imperial Mediterranan profile until 1956, if not later still. 
Spain, which had greatly declined as an imperial power, was further 
rent apart by civil war, then took time to mend and heal largely in 
isolation; meanwhile Gibraltar remained an open sore in Anglo-Spanish 
relations, as indeed it remains, in changing ways, to this very day. Having 
lost Gibraltar and been unable to regain it from Britain, Spain had to 
settle for a limited, rickety and generally rather short-lived Mediterranean 
8. My paper was called "Strains of Maltese Europeanity : Shifting Identities on 
the Mediterranean Frontier." 
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presence in Morocco, losing even the city of Tangier just across the narrow 
strait from Gibraltar. 
The newly-unified Italian state after 1870 was also on the look out 
for territory in the Mediterranean, wherein it had a large protruding 
peninsular "boot", a coastal frontier on three sides accosting its own land 
mass facing west, east and south. To its chagrin, Italy had lost out to 
France when it came to taking Tunis in 1882; but finally, in 1911, Italy 
did get Tripolitania and Cyreanaica, in addition to other earlier or later 
acquisitions which it had long coveted in East Mrica and which, by 1936, 
were hugging the Egyptian and Sudanese borders, partly commanding 
the sources of the Nile. 
The creation of such imperial Mediterranean networks from the 
18 th century onwards was not without repercussions on the native 
inhabitants of the respective territories, be they islands, enclaves or larger 
coastal territories. Unfolding generationally over time, such consequences 
came to be fairly incisive and lasting, in some parts more than in others. 
They were not quite like water over a duck's back. 
I see them as a multi-faceted cultural mould, situated in a three-pronged 
historical and geographical context: the imperial as it inter-acted with the 
European, and as this inter-acted in turn, or simultaneously, with the 
Medterranean sea and littoral itself Clearly, there is a further cultural inter-
action with North Mrica and the Near East, although I am afraid the 
Mediterranean can be seen in time at least as much as a divider as a unifier. 
With the passage of time and, ironically, as a distillation of difference 
rather than of convergence arises, any integrated long-term reasonance in 
such a Euro-Arab, North-South relationship renders itself open to further 
critical scrutiny, in European terms perhaps increasingly so. 
The impact of European mainland empires on occupied territory 
overseas depended to some extent on the colonizer's own profile and 
agenda; but it also depended on the nature of the land and on the 
texture of the occupied society. Of course, colonial empires around the 
world differed by epoch, by location, by attitude and manner of dealing. 
In considering the Mediterranean, the first realisation that strikes me 
is that only the British did not have to face armed popular indigeneous 
resistance, as slowly but surely they went about painting one part after 
another of this region red on their mappa mundi. 
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Nowhere, in the Mediterranean lands which they took over, was 
there any substantial or prolonged open warfare against their arrival. 
Not even in Egypt was there an Abd-el-Kader, as in Algeria; or an 
Omar Mukhtar, as in Libya. Not only was Urabi Pasha's rebellion quickly 
put down following the bombardment of Alexandria and the battle of 
Tel el-Kebir in 1882; it was by an agreement reached with the long-
indebted ruler, the Khedive Tewfiq, supposedly another Western-
influenced modernizer, that they established their presence in the country 
and then consolidated it. 
In Cyprus, the Greek Orthodox etnarchy initially welcomed the 
British takeover as a would-be liberation from the Ottoman yoke; a step 
in the direction of union with Holy Mother Greece. At the same time, 
the Ottoman Empire, still nominally sovereign, continued receiving its 
"tribute" in hard currency. 
In Malta, an improvised national leadership sought, and secured from 
the King of the Two Sicilies, permission so that Admiral Nelson and his 
men would sail to the rescue of the islands from a dragging insurrection 
against the beseiged French who, led by General Bonaparte on his way 
to Egypt only some months earlier, had kicked out the Knights of St John. 
The British then disarmed the Maltese insurgents and stayed on for nearly 
two centuries. 
The far-flung Ionian peasant islanders, who had changed hands a few 
times before 1814 and retained a Franco-Venetian veneer, had practically 
no say in the matter. Their demands for enosis were eventually heeded. 
In 1864 they were returned to Greece. 
As for the Gibraltarians, to the extent that these may be said to 
have existed at all as such, they were simply the inhabitants of a "Rock", 
the strategic value of which, at the Atlantic mouth of the Mediterranean 
in between two continents, the British were quick to realise, to grab 
and to hold on to at all costs; so long, that is, as it suited them to 
do so. In time, as the very ethnicity of the inhabitants changed, and 
for other reasons, these subjects grew so fond of their protectors and 
providers that they wanted to belong with them for ever: "English we 
are, English we stay", one referendum poster proclaimed a full decade 
after the Anglo-French retreat from Suez. The then "Gibraltarian" socio-
political scenario was colourfully and evocatively depicted in 1967 by 
The Gibraltar-Malta Nexus l09 
John Stewart, who worked for ten years as a journalist with The Gibraltar 
Chronicle and had full access to the Garrison Library's papers9. On the 
other side of La Linea, it must be said, for nearly forty years until 
1975, Gibraltar had Franco's Spain - hardly an appetizer for rejoining 
the onetime mother country, in spite of the economic gains which his 
conservative, authoritarian regime had been slowly registering. 
Dominant at sea, and islanders themselves, the British proved to 
be experts in obtaining overseas possessions decisively - nurturing 
collaboration, accommodating compromise, controlling arteries, using 
intermediaries - what it took the French and Italians many years to 
secure in more frontal and much bloodier confrontations on the ground, 
in still vaster territories with trickier hinterlands and tribal configur-
ations. These latter mainland powers were themselves generally more 
rural and agricultural, less industrial and technological, with an excess 
of population needing space and opportunity for more productive 
employment in "annexes" dose to their shores, just across the water as 
it were. 
The texture of indigeneous society also mattered, however. With 
regard to Brtiain's empire in the Mediterranean, the cultural mould may 
have been, in a sense, rather more malleable. Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian 
Islands and Cyprus were mainly, if not entirely, peopled by Europeans 
who, for the most part, were also Christians of one denomination or 
another. Heirs to a Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian heritage, in some 
cases more ancient or intense than Britain's own, they were also much 
smaller and more manageable, the Troodos Mountains notwithstanding. 
9. See John D. Stew art, Gibraltar The Keystone (London: Murray, 1967) and more 
recently Thomas J. Finlayson, Stories From The Rock (Gibraltar, 1996) for many 
a perceptive insight on Gibraltar's history and the way of life there as this 
evolved. Tom Finlayson's other work, The Fortress Came First (Gibraltar Books, 
2000) is really about the civlian population of Gibraltar during the Second 
World War, but aspects of it clearly complement my study Party Politics in 
a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience (Valletta: Midsea 1979, 2nd ed. 1991). 
See also, i. a., George Hills, Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar (London: 
Hale, 1974); records of the discussions on Gibraltar by the UN's special committee 
(in the 1960s), other reports, and various post-war articles that have appeared 
on Gibraltar and the Gibraltar question over the years in different sections 
of the press, often in a decolonization context. The "standard" history has 
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The one exception would seem to be Egypt. Even here, however, in 
contrast with the Maghreb, the Pharaonic past provided a rich and, in 
European eyes, a respectable if not awesome endowment, however 
backward the condition of the fellahin and the infrastructure would have 
seemed, at least before it started being opened up by railways and suchlike. 
Moreover, there was a sizeable indigenous Christian population, in all 
probability the original inhabitants of the country, their facial features 
depicted unmistakably in temples from Edfu to Komombo - the Copts 
- whose allegiance (as a deserving, discriminated minority eager for 
protection) a foreign ruling power could induce and attract; as happened 
ironically with the Muslim Turkish minority in Cyprus under British rule. 
In the Mediterranean, Egypt would turn out to be ultimately the most 
problematic and dramatic British possession of all. The difficulties were 
caused increasingly by culture clash, social and economic conflict and 
expectation, and a growing use of Islam and Arabic separateness to 
mobilize anti-European nationalism, right up to Nasser's bold 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. Egypt by 1956 brought the old 
been that by a former governor, Sir William Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians: 
A History of Gibraltar, first published in Britain in 1987 with a fourth edition 
by Gibraltar Books in 2001. A resident author, who also edits the Gibraltar 
Heritage Journal, is Tito Benady, a Gibraltarian Jew, while earlier works by 
Mesod Benady, especially The Roots of Gibraltarian Society and Culture (Gibraltar: 
Calpe, 1979) are particularly relevant, as is H. W. Howes, The Gibraltarian: 
The Origin and Development of the Population of Gibraltar from 1704; first published 
in 1951 this is now in its third edition (Gibraltar, 1991). On the "Maltese-
Gibraltarian" nationality, culture and politics issue in addition to works already 
referred to earlier, see also, i.a., my "Britain's European Mediterranean: Language, 
Religion and Politics in Lord Strickland's Malta, 1927-1930", History of European 
Ideas, 26: 1 (1995),47-65; "Language and Nationhood: Some Comparative and 
Theoretical Approaches to the Maltese Experience", in Collected Papers, (ed. 
S. Fiorini and R. Ellul Micallef (Malta: University of Malta, 1992), 439-470; 
"Italy and Britain in Maltese Colonial Nationalism", History of European Ideas, 
15: 4-6 (1992), 733-739; "The Influence of Fascism on Maltese Colonial Politics", 
in Malta: A Case Study in International Cross Currents, ed. S. Fiorini and V. Mallia-
Milanes (Malta: University of Malta, 1991); "Language and Nationality in an 
Island Colony: Malta", Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 3: 1 (1975), 
22-31. See also, by the same author, "Can a New History Save Europe from 
Its Past?" in Towards a Pluralist and Tolerant Approach to Teaching History: 
A Range of Sources and New Didactics (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999; 
repr. 2000). 
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European imperial powers, Britain and France, to a humiliating knee-
deep war scenario which sounded the retreat from Empire and a hastening 
of decolonisation all round. 
European settlers, hundreds of thousands of whom had been born 
and raised in northern Africa, in Egypt too - including so many Maltese 
and Iberian families, Italians, Greeks and naturally Frenchmen, who had 
lived, worked and brought up families there, as many of their parents 
and grand-parents had done before them - were forced to leave or were 
thrown out lock, stock and barrel, without compensation, in a mood 
which is reminiscent of that animating the Mugabe regime today in 
Zimbabwe - such a beautiful, fertile and once well-serviced land, now 
famished, torn and repressed, but in 1980 still a potential politico-
economic and multi-ethnic national role model for the whole of Africa. 
Meanwhile, population transplant or shift has not been unknown to 
Gibraltar either, first in the years following a British takeover when many 
of the residents left for Spain; and then during the Second World War, 
when the civilian population was evacuated as a safety measure; or when 
Moroccan labourers, since integrated, were "imported" in relatively large 
numbers. Messing around with native populations is a tide which need 
not lead to fortune, as we have all too sadly seen again and again, as when 
corsairs earlier carted away scores of inhabitants into slavery from exposed 
islands, such as Gozo; but in the case of modern Gibraltar no main inter-
ethnic problems seem to have arisen. 
Apart from Egypt - if we exclude Britain's mandate over Palestine 
between the 20rh century's world wars, and its maddeningly interminable 
complications - the more turbulent imperialist-nationalist clashes and 
divisions were experienced in Cyprus, until a tripartite agreement of sorts 
was reached in 1960; and of course later still and differently, particularly 
in the wake of the attempted .Greek coup in 1974 and the subsequent 
Turkish invasion. 
Malta and Gibraltar have both had their ups and downs; but, all told, 
they have had a smoother run. Although the latter is much smaller than 
the former, in the overlapping three-pronged scenario I have earmarked 
- Imperial, European and Mediterranean - the similarities here are rather 
more marked. They bear some interesting comparisons, which may be 
approached under a number of headings. 
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An inkling of the parallel and sometimes converging roles of these 
two places, to some extent also of their physical characteristics and human 
habitats, as strategic outposts of empire lined up on the Mediterranean 
route, may be had from an illustrated book which was compiled by an 
Englishman, approved by the military censor, and published in London 
in 1915. Called Malta and Gibraltar, this was subtitled: "Historical and 
Descriptive Commercial and Industrial Facts and Figutes and Resources." 
In the first sentence of its preface, Malta and Gibraltar are defined as 
"bulwarks of the Empire on which the sun never sets, there are no places 
like them anywhere." Each, it added, is "the complement of the other; 
and so long as the Union Jack is an emblem of British naval supremacy 
and of liberty and justice, so long will they be amongst the most valuable 
of all the widespread British possessions ... " Fortifications, antiquities, 
buildings, the port and harbour, the environs, garrisons, governors, 
commandants, even postage stamps are dealt with. In so far as the actual 
native inhabitants are concerned, the only insight we get in the Gibraltar 
section lies in the last chapter on commerial firms. Through these, one 
can see how both places had branches of some of the same London-based 
imperial enterprises, be it Saccone and Speed, the wine and spirit 
merchants; or the Anglo-Egyptian Bank. Surnames of dealers are trickier 
because both places had so many names of Spanish, Italian or British 
origin, but a number of these establishments in Gibraltar already had a 
Maltese ring to them - Fava, Ellul, Cardona, Schembri. These last, 
Schembri and Co., based at 97, Main Street, Gibraltar, were grocers and 
provision merchants, such typical entrepot activity being driven by the 
imperial trade routes, products, markets, and service needs relating to all 
kind of shipping, the Royal Navy above all. Both localities even had a 
locally-produced pro-British newspaper called the Chronicle, which 
catered for a readership by the garrison, among others IO • 
If we take the strategic component first, location in a geo-political 
context probably takes pride of place. If Gibraltar guarded the entrance 
to and the exit from the Western Meditrrranean, Malta lay in the 
European southern flank, l'ultimo lembo d1talia, as some called it, to the 
10. See Allister Macmillan, ed., Malta and Gibraltar (London: Collingridge,1915), 
passim. 
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south even of the northernmost Tunisian promontory. The geographical 
imperative was rendered more dominant by Valletta's sheltered deep-water 
harbours and creeks, a special attraction since ancient times. What Britain 
held out against Spain for in Gibraltar, it held out for against France, 
then Italy, in the case of Malta. Of Britain's possessions in the 
Mediterranean, the Imperial presence came to be most pronounced where 
it lasted the longest of all - in Gibraltar and in Malta. 
Malta had not been exempt from an Iberian influence in the past, 
although that was never as pronounced as it was in Gibraltar. Like 
Gibraltar, Malta belonged to Spain, but its fortunes changed for two main 
reasons. First, Emperor Charles V gave it as a fiefdom to the Knights 
of St John, a multi-ethnic European body with a preponderance of French 
members. Second, Malta came to be more closely linked to the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies in Naples and Palermo, and hence to Italy, rather than 
to Spain itself. Suffice it to note that of its 28 Grand Masters between 
the 16d1 and the 18d1 century, eight were Aragonese and three Portugese. 
Another three were Italian, the rest, almost half of the total, being entirely 
French (with only one German exception towards the very end). 
Until the early 19[h century Spain was one of Malta's trading 
partners, especially but not only in the cotton industry. Sicily was closer, 
but it was the Spanish coast, from Barcelona to Valencia to Cadiz, that 
mostly attracted the Maltese cotton trade and Maltese settlers exporting 
it as a textile product, including sails11 • As the British Empire asserted 
its influence, however, and for other reasons, trading patterns and 
practices changed, with the Maltese economy becoming so much more 
dependent, almost as much as in Gibraltar, on that of fortress and 
garrison needs. Such needs increasingly affected employment and, in 
different ways, population shift. Contraband was not exactly unknown 
in Gibraltar, until quite recently; although it was during Napoleon's 
Continental Blockade that Malta and to a lesser extent Gibraltar had 
excelled at that, for obvious reasons. 
Changes in population, with an occasional transplant of foreign 
stock, had a longer history in the case of Malta, where they had 
11. See Carmelo Vassallo, Corsairing to Commerce: Maltese Merchants in Eighteenth 
Century Spain (Valletta, publisher, 1997), but see also Peter Earle, Corsairs of 
Malta and Barbary (London: publisher, 1970). 
114 Henry Frendo 
sometimes resulted from corsair raids, as in other parts of the 
Mediterranean from West to East. At other times, people fled in fear 
of impending doom, as in the mid-1550s, when Gozo's population was 
just about carted away into slavery by the corsair Dragut, and the mid-
1560s, when Suleiman the Magnificent had set his sights on acquiring 
Malta in the westward advance of the Ottoman Empire, and of Islam. 
The closest terra forma in Malta's case was Sicily, only 58 miles away. 
As for Gibraltar, in an Anglo-Spanish confrontation with Protestant-
Catholic overtones, one could simply escape to the mainland on foot, 
or by boat. Geography again helps determine history here, as the absence 
of a water divide - and indeed of water - would have made it easier to 
depopulate. Size was also a factor in the rapidity and extent of 
assimilation or otherwise. The last mass influx absorbed by Malta, that 
of some 5,000 Greek Orthodox Rhodians, goes back to the arrival of 
the Order of St John from Rhodes in 1530. There has not been in 
recent times a mass influx comparable to that of some 2,000 Moroccans 
imported into Gibraltar as labourers to make good for the Spanish 
workers who could no longer cross the border when this was closed by 
Spain only a few decades ago. 
The 19th century is crucial to the profile which to a greater or lesser 
extent begins to mark both places. British immigration policy was fairly 
liberal, unless this was seen to pose a political threat or security risk. 
Gibraltar's Jewish community was and (at some 600) remains much 
larger than Malta's; but we do find a Jewish commuinity flourishing in 
Malta in the late Middle Ages, with most doctors, for example, being 
Jews l2 • Expulsions rendered Jewish survivance, both ethnic and religious, 
difficult, so that as in Spain persecution led to conversions of 
convenience or departures, not always followed by repatriations. A small 
Maltese-Jewish community survives and prospers in Malta to this day, 
although conventional inter-marriage within the community has become 
practically impossible. It is clear from the census records to which I 
have had some access that the Jewish presence has been much more 
pronounced in Gibraltar in more recent times, even in the political 
12. See Godfrey Wettinger, The Jews of Malta in the Late Middle Ages (Valletta, 
Midsea, 1985). 
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sphere. I only know of one Maltese MP, a Shadow Minister, whose 
mother is a native Jewess (Mizzi, nee Cohen). It is in another area that 
some tension may be arising as the numbers of Arabs and Muslims in 
Malta have been growing, through immigration and inter-marriage with 
some of the young Roman Catholic womanfolk, with some of the 
husbands becoming more publicly assertive. 
Pressures from one boat-load after another of mainly Arab and 
Mrican illegal migrants, many of whom then claim refugee status, has 
also been growing of late. This inter-ethnic, inter-religious integration 
or hostility is now a European phenomenon on a much larger scale13• 
Gibraltar and Malta are just microcosms of it and, if only by force of 
circumstance, they have so far learnt to be more accepting and 
accommodating than others. 
Another possible comparison might be the small Indian minority 
which, in the case of Malta, hails mainly from Hyderabad in the Sind 
province of north-western India, near Bombay. These came to Malta 
during British rule largely from Egypt, starting in the 1880s14 • They 
have always been mainly traders, mainly in silks and cloth, but they 
have integrated well, in some cases in post-war Malta inter-marrying 
with Maltese Catholics in spite of their own Hindu background. School 
friendships with Maltese Indians, as in the case with Maltese Jews, 
who pre-date them in time, sometimes last lifetimes and become 
intimate. As in Gibraltar, a sari in a shopping mall need not signify a 
foreigner as such. It would be interesting to compare intra-communal 
relations and acceptance levels in coastal communities so small as those 
in Gibraltrar and in Malta. It was probably more those associated by 
birth or politics with pro-Italian or pro-Spanish sympathies who found 
the going tough, especially at certain stages. The smaller ethnic and/or 
religious minorities were not perceived as a threat; they could be the 
more easily contained. 
13. See e.g. Henry Frendo, L-Identitil Ewropea: Tezisti? (Jean Monnet Seminar, 
Maltese European Studies Association, 2002). 
14. See Mark Anthony Falzon, "Origins and Establishment of the Indian Business 
Community in Malta", Bank of Valletta Review, (Autumn 2001),73-92; Henry 
Frendo, Censu Tabone: The Man and His Century (Valletta, Maltese Studies, 
2000, 2nd edn 2001), 290-291. 
116 Henry Frendo 
The other comparable feature is religion. Although there is a higher 
percentage of Protestants in Gibraltar than there has been in Malta, 
the Catholic Church having acted as a nationalistic bulwark against 
colonialism, in both areas Roman Catholicism remains the predominant 
creed and custom. Such an affinity with the Church of Rome, in British-
ruled domains, marked out and rather profiled the separate identity of 
their inhabitants, as in Ireland or Canada. It is clear from the census 
records that I have seen (thanks to the CD prepared by my friend 
Professor Larry Sawchuk of Toronto 15, and some voluntary field research 
assistance from a Gibraltarian namesake, Mrs Kelly Frendo) that Malta-
born settlers in Gibraltar were invariably listed as Roman Catholics, 
even when they came from Corfu or anywhere else, as were their 
numerous descendants. This usually devout Roman Catholicism 
ascertained a European belonging, in spite of Semitic or Moorish traces 
in the language, in the mores or in the genes. Worth remarking also 
is that the Anglican bishop was based at Gibraltar but he also had a 
princely residence in Valletta, just opposite the Anglican cathedral built 
in 1837. 
Census data are very helpful to map out occupations, classes and 
mobility. Thus it is clear from the 1878 census that most Maltese settlers 
in Gibraltar - the Azzopardis, the Borgs, the Caruanas, and so on -
were working on the wharves, for the most part carrying coal. It is 
probably what they might have done or seen done back home, before 
they emigrated, although a notice advertising vacancies for coalheavers 
was posted from Gibraltar to Malta at one point. In other words, 
Maltese would have simply have applied for job vacancies in Gibraltar, 
where as British subjects they would not have been barred as aliens. 
Most were in their twenties and thirties. It was a gruelling occupation. 
Maybe the demand was greater in Gibraltar, or the prospects slightly 
better compared to those prevaling in Malta at one time or another 
during course of the 19th century. 
A few were milkmen, which shows that there was also a small rural-
agricultural component in the Maltese immigration to Gibraltar. This was 
15. See especially the CD, Gibraltar Explorer (Los Angeles, 2001) by L. A. Sawchuk, 
S. Sharma and W. Grainger. . 
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a typical occupation which villagers came to town to perform, milking 
the goats and sheep in cans on doorsteps. Working on early Maltese 
migration in the American Deep South two years ago, I found that one 
of the earliest Maltese settlers in New Orleans similarly described himself 
as "the milkman"; he actually had a little dairy adjoining his house on 
the outskirts of the town l6. One 58 year-old listed as Simon (Xmun?) 
Frendo in the 1891 Gibraltar census (who like his 40 year-old wife 
Catalina, and a 20 year-old son listed as Jose, a coalheaver, had been born 
in Malta) was a goatherd. Six of these Frendo children were born in 
Gibraltar, the youngest, Spiro, being three years old in 1891. They lived 
nine to a room at 2, Imossi's Farm. Others in Gibraltar were, typically, 
small traders and petty vendors, including the occasional "bumboatman". 
Hardly any at all in the first generations of settlers belonged to the 
professional classes; although the earliest known Maltese settler, in 1791, 
was an apothecaryl?; he must have run the local pharmacy. 
Places of residence are also indicative of social and occupational 
position. Thus in 1878 we may not find Maltese settlers residing in the 
best areas of town; but that would have changed as integration and social 
mobility increased, in accordance with the general typology of 
immigration and acculturation. Given such a situation, scapegoating 
could arise, as it indeed did in at least one case in the late 19th century 
during an epidemicl8. Typical Maltese and Maltese-sounding surnames 
gradually became a feature of Gibraltarian life and clearly span right across 
the socio-political spectrum from top to bottom. A majority of the settlers 
being males, such surnames would not have been adversely affected by 
mixed marriages, although spellings and pronounciation sometimes 
changed or were changed in transcription, usually it seems Hispanicised 
or Anglicised. 
Another point of interest emerging from these census returns concerns 
the retention of contacts with the mother country, although Gibraltar 
16. This research project is still in progress. 
17. A book called The Gibraltarian: The Origin and Evolution of the People of Gibraltar, 
published in 1951, contains an analysiS of Gibraltar's adult working 
population. 
18. On this see L. A. Sawchuk, Deadly Visitations in Dark Times: A Social History 
of Gibraltar (Gibraltar, 2001), 254-257. 
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was further away by sea from Valletta than was Bona, Tunis or Alexandria. 
It would be intriguing to establish what percentage of Malta-born 
emigrants to Gibraltar came directly from Malta or else from Maltese 
colonies settled in French North Africa, as these tended to retain their 
British passports for as long as they could and generally resisted 
naturalisation as Frenchmen if they could help it. 
Such contacts would have been facilitated by the common status 
Gibraltarian Maltese enjoyed as British subjects, and by common 
concerns arising from Imperial interests in the region. An obvious case 
would be that at the turn of the century, when major public works 
were being undertaken in the Grand Harbour, involving the building 
of major dry docks and of a breakwater. The local labour supply could 
not cope with such London-financed infrastructural requirements, 
undertaken in one fell swoop. Italian and Spanish labour was therefore 
imported. Although similar works were being undertaken in Gibraltar 
and elsewhere, some Gibraltar workers travelled to Malta with Spaniards 
for some years. Inevitably, in this process, family contacts would have 
been renewed, and some inter-marriages taken place, before an eventual 
repatriation. Much research still needs to be undertaken to determine 
the quality and extent of such a rapport. One source is the passport 
applications; another the passenger lists on vessels plying across 
Mediterranean shores. 
Because Malta was larger, as was its population (at some 200,000 in 
1900, it would have been twenty times the size of Gibraltar's), more space 
continued to be available for agriculture, which could hardly be the case 
in Gibraltar. However, employment with the British Services, particularly 
at the Royal Dockyard, on the wharves, in the harbour areas, and in 
entrepot trade, steadily attracted labour supply away from the land, to 
the ports. What this meant, in Malta too, was a growing economic 
dependence on imperial needs and interests. These could provide jobs 
and prosperity when times were good, fostering assimilation, loyalty and 
allegiance; but they created stalemates, depression and disenchantment 
when times were bad. The livelihood of native peoples in imperial 
outposts - in the Mediterranean, most notably Gibraltar and Malta -
came to depend largely on the British defence budget, on the fleet's 
movements, and whatever else needed to be bolstered or run down at 
The Gibraltar-Malta Nexus 119 
Westminster's or Whitehall's behest. 
Psychologically and culturally, native peoples in such imperial outposts 
were hardly perceived to exist as such, or to do so autonomously, as 
ethnico-linguistic entities with a geographical-historical make-up peculiar 
to themselves. It was not uncommon for Malta to be regarded as "the 
deck of a man-of war", or, as Winston Churchill once called it in more 
modern times, "an unsinkable aircraft carrier". For obvious reasons this 
tendency was present a fortiori in the other still smaller fortress of 
Gibraltar. It was a convenient militaristic terminology which, if applied 
politically, would dismiss at a stroke any internal demands for greater 
freedom or respect. What it meant was that essentially government in 
such territories depended on the Admiralty and the War Office, as their 
lobbies influenced parliament if and as necessary. 
Once again this predicament was more felt in Gibraltar, as indeed 
it has continued to be in different ways. Gibraltarians obtained the right 
to vote in 1950, exactly one century after Malta's first elections held under 
British rule, although a measure of internal self-government was achieved 
by 1964. But even in Malta, an independent state since 1964, 
constitutional development was, as has been well said, like a game of 
snakes-and-Iadders. The decision to permit representative government in 
1887 (revoked in 1903), and subsequently internal self-government in 
1921 (suspended in 1930 and revoked in 1933; restituted in 1947 and 
then revoked again in 1959), was motived to a degree by the imperial 
interest of not unduly antagonizing the otherwise loyal population of an 
imperial fortress. For purposes of mutual interest, given the situation as 
it had developed over the years, Borg Olivier's independence in 1964 came 
packaged with a 10-year defence and finance agreement, which was re-
negotiated by Mintoff and actually extended until 1979. Conceding 
autonomous rights, with defence and foreign affairs reserved to the 
Crown, was thus, in its own way, a control mechanism, a "release of air" 
strategem that always took place in a strategic context. 
Another comparable feature in the Gibraltar-Malta nexus, which 
certainly deserves more attention, lies in the domain of culture and 
nationality. In both habitats there has been an ethnic, linguistic and 
religious mix much influenced by contrasting and often conflicting geo-
political pulls. Equally, however, and simultaneoulsy, there has been an 
120 Henry Frendo 
ongoing moulding which marked the distinctive personalities and pro-
files of place and people. This complex and profound characteristic has 
resulted in a special European Mediterranean brew on the margins of the 
continental mainland, with an inherited British or English residue. It is 
a residue, interspersed with mainstream lifestyles, which has been less of 
a veneer than elsewhere, as in Egypt or Cyprus. In the latter two pos-
sessions, Arabic and Greek continued to be the predominant languages, 
in spite of any officialdom. In Gibraltar and in Malta, however, angli-
cization was promoted, in the former at the expense of Spanish, in the 
latter at the expense of Italian, in both cases the long-established literary 
languages. In both the spoken vernaculars, moreover, there was a Semitic 
streak through varieties of Moorish Arabic. This was more so in Mal-
tese, which was basically a Semitic language written in the Roman script 
and increasingly camouflaged by Romance components. Ironically, the 
Moors ruled over Gibraltar for five centuries more than the Arabs did 
in Malta, but whereas Gibraltar was Hispanicized between the 15 th and 
18th centuries, Malta was not that Italianized. The Knights of St John, 
which ruled Malta between the 16th and 18th century, acted like a race 
apart; although Italian was the main language most of the inhabitants 
were illiterate, using their old vernacular among themselves. Italy never 
got much of a chance to standardize an Italo-Maltese, because Malta did 
not revert to Naples after the French ousted the Knights, before they were 
in turn ousted by the British. 
With British help, Maltese was raised to an official national language, 
with its own orthography and literature, especially from 1934 onwards, 
through constitutional changes in the education system, the public service 
and the court-room. On the Macaulay principle recommended for India, 
it would serve as a means for promoting English, so that a class of 
intermediaries, support staff and collaborators could be created. Gibraltar 
has its own vernacular touch in the popular speech as well, although from 
what I have managed to find out about it, this retains Spanish at its base 
much more than Maltese has done with Italian. It is basically Spanish, 
whereas Maltese has not been basically Italian. To what extent this has 
happened or not once again seems a fit object for advanced study, given 
that language is so crucial a component of self-identity, which in turn 
is likely to influence future development in other spheres. 
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At the political level, Britain in Gibraltar was from the start keen and 
actively engaged in excluding Spain and, so far as possible, Spanish from 
any undue influence over the native inhabitants, change as these did after 
the 1704 conquest. Anglo-Spanish rivalry at sea, in religious allegiance 
and internationally, needs no further recounting here; Spain moreover 
had an imperial past which was more recent and more relevant to Britain 
than Rome's. In Malta, however, the British were also increasingly keen 
to de-Italianize the islands, and especially so after Italy had become a 
unified nation-state in 1870. In a telling instruction as early as 1882, 
the year when Britain took Egypt, it was made clear that no Maltese who 
did not know English well would be appointed to any government-
controlled job, nor promoted in it. In the words of the Lieutenant-
Governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson: 
Insist on a knowledge of English in all public appointments. Appoint no one and promote 
no one who does not thoroughly understand it. Pay your public service well and make the 
public officers as comfortable as possible. And let those who oppose English understand 
that their opposition shuts them out from all hope of employment or fovour from the 
Government. Appeal, in a word, to their personal interest/9• 
As by now the cycle of economic dependence had grown roots, such 
a policy was no mean threat. It was intended to dissuade the Italian-
educated lawyer-politicians from opposing anglicisation while demand-
ing autonomy; and more insidiously to turn against them the lower 
classes who increasingly depended for their livelihood on the British 
connection. While Anglo-Spanish confrontation over the would-be status 
of Gibraltar has tended to concentrate on territory and sovereignty, Anglo-
Italian rivalry in Malta became more internalized and was predicated 
mainly on linguistic-cultural tradition, sentimental affinity, political power 
and social class. 
One common feature in the Gibraltar-Malta nexus clearly were the 
harbours, the wharves, and particularly the docks - to the point that 
during the inter-war period comparisons were made between the working 
and living conditions in the two outposts before any salary rises would 
19. Henry Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience (Valletta, 
1979; 2nd edn 1991), 32. 
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be consented to by the Admiralty, in response to petitions from the 
unions. As one lengthy investigative report put it: 
It is important in this respect to bear in mind the position at Malta as in many ways, the 
positions at these two places is very closely comparable. Both are isolated Mediterranean 
communities (Malta, a group o/islands, Gibraltar, virtually an island), separated owing 
to political considerations from the neighbouring countries with which they would normally 
be united, maintained on their present basis solely for strategical considerations, both 
carrying a population much larger than they otherwise would for this reason, both Catholic 
communities, both with a standard o/Iiving tending to move more and more away from 
that 0/ the surrounding countries, both having the same problems 0/ food supply and 
over-population. 
On the strength of such perceptions, which are further elaborated and 
substantiated at length, the Admiralty would then consider any rises in 
payor otherwise: 
It seems desirable therefore to consider anything done at one in the light 0/ conditions 
obtaining at the other. The cost o/Iiving at Malta, both from the point o/view o/supplies 
and rents, seems to be somewhat cheaper than at Gibraltrar, but owing to the larger 
fomilies, the standard o/Iiving is apparently lower. (The birth rate at Gibraltar is consider-
ably higher than in England or Wales but that 0/ Malta easily outstrips the Gibraltar 
figuresYo 
To a relative outsider, the Gibraltar-Malta companson appears 
somewhat twisted when it comes to religion. Whereas Gibraltarians 
remained for the most part Roman Catholic, like their close neighbours 
across the line, they wanted no truck with Spain politically, before and 
after Franco. That was dangerous for more than one reason, but there 
was thus a cultural ingredient within local affinities which international 
politics and local interest rather kept apart. In Malta, on the other hand, 
Roman Catholicism acted as a bulwark of nationalism, neighbouring Italy 
being not simply the land of Dante but also of the Pope; whereas the 
anglicizing Britons were Protestants and sometimes proseleytizers. While 
there would have been some Catholic-Protestant tensions in Gibraltar as 
20. ADM 116/4994, f. 14. I owe copies of this original documentation to Mario 
Ellul, whose two theses about Malta's Royal Dockyard are unpublished - but 
see his article "Maltese Imperial Mentalities: Subjecting the Maltese Mind to 
Imperial Rule", Storja '98, 95-114. 
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well- as indeed we find throughout the Empire from Canada to Ireland 
to Australia - such tensions could not be perhaps so crystallized into an 
"us" against "them" mode, as Maltese nationalism sought to do with 
considerable success in its quest for self-government. 
Maltese nationalists who were regarded as pro-Italian or suspected of 
disloyalty were shunned or persecuted, especially in wartime, including 
however the First World War; as were others critical of the colonial regime 
and/or of its collaboration with the established Catholic Church in a 
generally well-orchestrated effort to ward off dissent. One problem which 
in varying degrees affected the whole Catholic world concerned mixed 
marragies, the raising of children in the faith, the fear of civil marriage 
and of divorce21 • Malta still does not have this last facility, while Gibraltar 
under British rule appears to have been more thoroughly secularized, to 
the point where I have seen Gibraltar advertised as an excellent place 
where divorcees can come to remarry in "cash-and-carry" fashion within 
the day, aided and abetted no doubt by the fact that, according to this 
information, Gibraltar has the highest per capita population of lawyers 
in the world - I thought Malta held that record, but surely it retains the 
priestly one. And all these Gibraltar lawyers are UK-qualified. Here too, 
the nexus breaks. Maltese law retained its Continental civil foundations; 
it was not much dented or infiltrated by English common and statue law, 
let alone driven by it. 
When it came to wartime, and considerations of loyalty or security, 
"the fortress came first", to quote Finalyson's term. Without charge or 
trial, scores of suspected potentially disloyal Maltese nationalists were 
"interned" and/or "deported" to Uganda between 1940 and 1942. In the 
case of Gibraltar, thousands of inhabitants were evacuated to Morocco, 
Madeira, Jamaica: Gibraltar's only function would be a defensive one 
confronting any German invasion across the Pyrenees, no place for 
civilians, i.e. the native inhabitants22• 
Unlike Gibraltar and everywhere else in the British Empire and 
Commmonwealth outside of Britain itself, Malta had a university 
21. For a discussion of this, see ibid., and also The Origins of Maltese Statehood: 
A Case Study of Decoionization in the Mediterranean (Valletta: PEGjBDL,1999; 
2nd edn 2000). 
22. On all this see Finlayson's already quoted book, passim. 
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producing lawyers, doctors and theologians well before the British arrived. 
This had been founded by the Jesuits in 1592 at the time of the Knights 
of St John, whose spiritual head was the Pope. All the Maltese codes were 
in Italian, taught in Italian, and they remained so until, well into the 
20th century, Maltese started to be used together with English instead of 
Italian, but the substance stayed. As in poetry, so too in law - a proper 
transition from Italian to English never took root in Malta: Maltese 
intervened to stop it. In his 1937 survey of British Commonwealth affairs 
W K. Hancock had wondered whether Malta was not too small an entity 
to survive the strong gusts of wind blowing from outside; it has in fact 
done so, somehow turning the winds to advantage, drawing water out 
of the ground, and holding tight. 
In terms of resistance to assimilation, culturally if not institutionally, 
Malteseness comes out as more marked, in spite of the surviving and 
perhaps growing Gibraltarian flavour permeating The Rock. In his letter 
to me of 18th August 1975, Gibraltar's then Leader of the Opposition, 
Mr Maurice Xiberras, wrote thus: 
... although there is ample evidence that the Gibraltarian would wish to enjoy equality 
o/status with Metropolitan Britons, that is, they would wish, in the jargon 0/ the day to 
be de-colonised, there has never been much organised support for nationalism. Nationality, 
on the other hand, has always been a central preoccupation. 23 
In other respects, the comparisons hold, even though much more 
comparative research in this strain is called for. That includes Malta's own 
referendum for integration with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland in 1956, in which most of those voting said "aye" 24; 
although in ways by no means comparable to the overwhelming 
Gibraltarian "yes" eleven years later. 
The need to depend mixed and matched with the will to be free. 
It still does, as the agitated lead-up to Malta's referendum in 2003 
about membership of the EU or otherwise, clearly demonstrated. But 
then again, Gibraltar, which is already an EU member through its British 
anchorage, geared up for another referendum in 2004 on "dual 
23. Xiberras/Frendo, House of Assembly, Gibraltar, 18 August, 1975, H. 1-2. 
24. For a focussed analysis see Dennis Austin, Malta and the End of Empire (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1971). 
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sovereignty", won again by the Anglophile 'loyaloists'. According to 
Spanish proposals at the time, a special arrangement would be reached 
with Britain whereby the latter would continue to enjoy guaranteed 
naval, maritime and other rights, with Gibraltar allowed a degree of 
municipal autonomy, on condition however of having sovereignty revert 
to Spain. Such a proposal bore a striking resemblance to that made 
by an up-and-coming Maltese nationalist leader, Dr Enrico Mizzi, in 
1912, one whereby Britain would similarly be assured of naval, military 
and maritime rights in Malta, which however would return to Italy, 
while retaining an autonomous status and certain special privileges, in 
exchange for Eritrea. The Spanish proposal never had a chance; not 
then anyway. Nor did Mizzi's: he was court-martialled in 1917, interned 
in 1940, deported in 1942, before becoming the Prime Minister of 
Malta in 1950, the year of his death in office. In 1963, a successor 
who had striven unsuccessfully for Malta's integration with Britain, Mr 
Dominic Mintoff, would himself contemplate some form of integration 
with Italy, possibly an autonomous regional status25 . In the case of Malta, 
Britain had simply usurped sovereignty from Naples in 1800 without 
binding itself to any international treaty obligation for the future, as 
happened in the case of Gibraltar with Spain in 1713. 
Let me conclude by revealing what I believe to be a contemporary 
symptom of this mutual predicament, one tending to characterise the 
perplexing insecurity and anticipation of islands and enclaves at the 
margins, where borders meet, cultures overlap and interests clash. 
From newly-released archival materials at the Forigin Office, it came 
to my attention in April 2004 that in 1971 Britain had considered 
handing over Gibraltar to the Knights of Malta. In these recently 
declassified documents, The Rock is described as "an extinct volcano" 
inhabited by "arrogant and unrealistic people". Britain's ambassador to 
Spain at the time was Sir John Russell, who died in 1984. In a 1971 
briefing note to the Foreign Office from Madrid, he wrote: 
Economically Gibraltar is of no benefit to us and indeed of late has begun to cost the 
British taxpayer money. Militarily, in the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile, 
Gibraltar can only be an extinct volcano. 
25. For discussions of these proposals see my own books Party Politics in a 
Fortress Colony, op. cit., and The Origins of Maltese Statehood, op. cit. 
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The Foreign Office papers show that British officials considered a 
compromise plan of handing over the territory to the Catholic Order of 
Malta under a lease agreement. "The Order would allow the citizens to 
be British or Spanish as they wished", Russell told the Foreign Office. 
"We would take a long lease on whatever we need. And there might be 
a provision for eventual reversion to Spain." 
One Foreign Office official was not impressed, however, by the 
ambassador's proposal. In a note attached to Russell's original letter, he 
wrote: "I don't know if Sir John Russell has ever seen the Order 
collectively assembled. I have. I would rather entrust Gibraltar to the 
ye L·b I ,,26 oung 1 era s. 
Having myself seen the same Order collectively assembled in their 
world reunion at St John's Cathedral in Valletta some fifteen years ago, 
I must say that the occasion was certainly not an unimpressive one, 
and that cannot be simply my traditional Catholic prejudice in an 
opposite direction. As a former member of the Young Liberals in my 
student days at Oxford, I can say that I never saw anything quite like 
it there. Whether the dazzling robes and insignia of knights of so many 
nationalities in the service of a Rome-based Christian chivalry and 
charity around the world would have been fit, in the 20th century, to 
run anything other than their own Order, remains well open to question. 
What has been leased out to them, in the meantime, has not been 
Gibraltar, but Fort St Angelo overlooking Valletta's Grand Harbour, on 
condition that they restore and maintain it, with conditional public 
access to it. 
To put it mildly, the problem is that, as a Maltese adage has it, "the 
small fish has never eaten the big fish"; although small fish have ways 
and means of getting around and surviving too, even as the Mediterranean 
becomes progressively depleted of them. The Foreign Secretary in 1971 
was Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The newly-available Foreign Office 
documents show that he proposed giving away Gibraltar's sovereignty to 
Spain, in exchange for a 999-year lease on the colony. Sir Alec suggested 
26. For an overview of these diplomatic exchanges, see "Gibraltar faced secret 
handover to Order of St John", The Malta Independent on Sunday, 21 April 
2002, 4. 
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it be put on a similar footing to Hong Kong, which was at the time still 
being leased from China, in order to appease Spain. Spain, his ambassador 
in Madrid told him, was being reasonable. And he added that Britain 
would feel the same if the Spanish Armada of 1588 had defeated Sir 
Francis Drake. "Had the Great Armada succeeded", Russell assured 
Douglas-Home, "we should today much dislike seeing a Spanish garrison 
on Land's End or Portland Bill." 
Both these ~roposals were soon dropped. According to The Sunday 
Telegraph of 14t April 1971, "power cuts, the threat of a miners' strike 
and the three-day week occupied ministers' minds more than the future 
of Gibraltar ... ; and by February 1974, Labour was back in power." 
Having just found out about these extraordinary diplomatic 
exchanges, I happened to mention them over a drink to Helen Wallace, 
one of the research directors at the European University Institute in 
Florence; and we shared a good laugh at Peter Hain's expense. Peter Hain, 
Minister for Europe in Britain's Labour ·administration, and responsible 
for negotiations with Spain over Gibraltar, had then been the national 
chairman of the Young Liberals. She promptly informed her husband 
William, a professor of international politics at London, who e-mailed 
me for permission to raise this matter in the House of Lords, of which 
he was a member. 
I told him that as a Maltese historian the Knights of Malta proposal 
did not really surprise me at all. Britain used Malta to the hilt in peace 
and war, but once it changed its defence policies and budgets it had no 
qualms in running down the dockyards, dismissing employees by the 
thousand and forcing the emigration issue, so that depression followed 
prosperity at regular intervals, with mass emigration supposedly the safety-
valve for want. 
Moreover, in 1940 - I told our latter-day William Wallace, who is 
an old acquaintance - on the eve of the Second World War, the British 
Cabinet had twice discussed the prospect of giving Malta - and indeed 
Gibraltrar as well - to Mussolini's Italy, in the hope that such a donation 
would induce him to stay out of the war rather than join it on Hitler's 
side. Just shortly before scores of Maltese nationalists suspected of 
disloyalty to the Crown were shipped across a bomb-ravaged 
Mediterranean Sea for deportation to Uganda without charge or trial, 
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Chamberlain, Halifax and Churchill more than once tossed the dice on 
a deal with Italy over Malta27 • However, they then decided to abandon 
such a proposal, in much the same way it seems that their successors 
would do thirty years later, when it came to another little-known proposal, 
that of handing Gibraltar to the Knights of Malta. 
In a covering note accompanying the copies of Hansard for 14(h May 
2002, my interlocutor assured me that these read very drily in print but 
that they had "aroused a lot of interest - and laughter - when spoken!,,28 
Historical empathy apart, this may constitute news which is of some direct 
concern to Gibraltar at the present time. The gist of the exchanges 
translates into an attempt to cordially reach a compromise agreement over 
Gibraltar with Spain, in response to a communications blockage or 
blackmail being imposed by Spain as a bartering card to get a hand, if 
not two hands, on Gibraltar, in spite of the fact that such behaviour is 
held to violate EU rules governing free movement and access (ferry, 
airport, ete.) If the rhetoric is down played, we are left with a few telling 
statements made by the Minister for Trade, Baroness Symons ofVernham 
Dean, which briefly read as follows: "We must continue to do what we 
believe to be right and in the interest of the people of Gibraltar, knowing 
that they will have a full say in the final decision .... They (the Spaniards) 
have a claim for sovereignty over Gibraltar, which we do not recognise, 
given the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht .... We have to look at the 
package of agreements that will be reached .... " 
Now at the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, for a respite from the 
Napoleonic Wars, Britain had agreed with France and other European 
powers to return Malta to the Order of St John. According to article 10 
of that Treaty, the islands would be held "upon the same conditions on 
which the Order held them previous to the war", except that certain other 
stipulations were made. 
To assuage lingering fears, these stipulations included one for 
27. See the bibliographical references (Richard Lamb; Elizabeth Barker; etc) in 
Henry Frendo, "The Second World War: A Short Introduction to The Epic of 
Malta", in a 1990 facsimile edition of Tile Epic of Malta (Lond., c. 1943, with 
a foreword by Sir Winston Churchill), iv. 
28. WallacejFrendo, House of Lords, London, 5 July 2002, enclosing the Hansard 
debates (House of Lords), vo!. 635, no. 137, for Tuesday, 14 May 2002. 
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international and another for local consumption. The first said that 
Britain and France, being desirous of placing the Order and the Island 
of Malta in a state of entire independence of each of those powers, agreed 
that henceforth there be no English or French langue, so that no 
individuals belonging to such langues would be admissable into the Order. 
The second said that a Maltese langue would be established, to be 
supported out of the land revenues and commercial duties of the Island; 
adding further that there would be dignitaries with appointments and 
an Auberge appropriated to this langue. Contrary to earlier practice, by 
which all locally born subjects including those who had been raised to 
the peerage by Spain in the Middle Ages were disqualified from joining 
the Order in their own land, henecforth no proofs of nobility would be 
necessary for the admission of Knights into the said Maltese langue. 
Maltese Knights would be eligible to hold office and to enjoy every 
privilege in a manner akin to that of the Knights of the other langues. 
Moreover, the municipal revenue, civil, judicial, and other offices under 
the Government of the Island would be filled at least in the proportion 
of one-half by the native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo and Comino (Article 
X.iii). British forces would evacuate the islands within three months after 
ratification, and a force would be provided by His Sicilian Majesty in 
support of the Order's re acquired possession of the Maltese Islands. The 
garrison would consist of at least one half of native Maltese. 
The independence of the Island of Malta and this whole arrangement, 
said the new Treaty, would be "under the protection and guarantee of 
Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Prussia. Having 
repeatedly spoken of Malta's independence, the Treaty then stipulated that 
the "perpetual neutrality" of the Order and of the Island of Malta was 
"hereby declared"; and that the ports of Malta would be opened to the 
commerce and navigation of all nations, who shall pay equal and 
moderate duties, which duties would be applied - a further sop - to the 
support of the Maltese langue, ete. 
It was an international guarantee which brings to mind a more recent 
one in the Mediterranean, that decreed for the independence of Cyprus 
in London in 1959, in the wake of EOKA and enosis. The status of 
Cyprus, as an independent unitary state, was subject to a tripartite 
guarantee precisely by the powers who were most interested in that island: 
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Britain; Greece; and Turkey, a stone's throwaway. By 1974, however, both 
Greece and Turkey had expressed some considerable interest in the island, 
while Britain clearly held on to two sovereign bases there. 
In the case at hand, between 1798 and 1800 the Maltese had 
conducted a bloody armed insurrection against French rule for two long 
years, helped along by a British-led naval blockade, which Naples had 
granted them permission to request as a temporary anti-French expedient. 
Such a treaty, agreed to above their heads at Amiens, added insult to 
injury; it was as unacceptable as it seemed dangerous. Was it for this that 
we shed our blood against the tyranny of France, they asked. If the Order 
could not defend Malta against a French takeover in 1798, how on earth 
would it do so in 1802? And in any case, the Maltese did not want the 
Order back. 
In an eloquent and somewhat indulgent Dichiarazione dei Diritti 
degli Abitanti di Malta e Gozo signed on 15 th June 1802 by the leaders 
of all the towns and villages who had commanded the insurrection 
against French rule, they made it clear that they had asked for British 
protection and offered the Islands to His Majesty on the understanding 
that their rights and privileges would be safeguarded and that, given 
such a pact, Britain had no right to cede Malta to any other power. In 
that case, sovereignty should revert to the native inhabitants themselves. 
It would be up to them to decide whether they wished to invite someone 
else to protect them, or indeed to run the place themselves as they 
deemed fil9• 
The Anglo-French rapprochement was short-lived: by 1803 a Third 
Coalition against Napoleon was in place. The Order never returned to 
Malta; nor did France; nor indeed did Naples. Ignoring Spain's deed of 
cession of Malta to the Order as a fief in 1530, and Neapolitan claims 
to a legitimate sovereignty over it until the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
and later still, Britain overturned its decision to evacuate, and dug in. 
"You see Malta is taken, and the French driven out", wrote Queen 
Caroline to Lady Hamilton in October 1800. "That is all very well but 
the King and all of us are mortified that there was no representative of 
29. Henry Frendo, Tifkira tal-200 Sena mid-Dikjarazzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Maltin 
(Valletta) (Kumitat Festi NazzjonalijUniversita ta' Malta, 2002). 
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ours there although we had troops, ammunition, artillery and positive 
rights in the Island. The only flag was the English: our being so completely 
duped is the subject of much laughter here.,,3o 
For half a century after that, Malta did not have a constitution; 
and no elected majority in a council of government, as a crown colony, 
before 1887; which by imperial standards was not too bad. The British 
held on to their prize later when Anglo-French relations took a different 
turn, fighting wars in common as allies, if warding off the Italians 
who were too close for comfort, until these too became useful allies 
and cordial partners. It was only when Britain had no further real need 
of Malta, and therefore no further money to invest in it, as 
decolonization set in worldwide, that they lent an ear to the request 
for independence, accompanied as this was initially by a "defence and 
finance" agreement. It worked; although autonomy and dependence 
remained uncertain. 
The integration plan with Britain, mooted by Mintoff's 
administration in the mid-1950s, had fallen through after Suez, never 
to be revived. Constitutionally speaking, that would have been the closest 
rapprochement of Malta to Gibraltar, if not one closer, but it fell through, 
as did any such proposal for Gibraltar itself More recent talks concerned 
the eventual repercussions, for good or ill, of another genre of integration, 
a wider one. Here, Britain is only one of the players, without its imperial 
swagger and sway as of old. In the European Union, referenda are 
customarily held; repeatedly if necessary; although none ever had such 
an almost absolute outcome as the Gibraltar one of 2002 throwing out 
any joint Anglo-Spanish patronage of The Rock. This dogged resistance 
persisted, to much the same extent, until still more recently. 
As for the Maltese Dichiarazione dei Diritti of 1802, denouncing the 
transfer of Malta from Britain to a supposedly guaranteed neutrality by 
her, France and other European powers, under the "returned" Order of 
St John, that was two hundred years ago; and the world has changed, 
although not too much. 
30. A. V. Laferla, British Malta (Valletta: publisher, 1946), Vol. 1, 3-4. Laferla, 
among others, also gives the text of article X of the Treaty of Amiens. Co-
incidentally, in the Treaty of Utrecht 1813, the article about Gibraltar is also 
the tenth. 
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Still, a message such as that chosen by Sir William Jackson and Francis 
Cantos for the title to their biography of Sir Josha Hassan, From Fortress 
to Democrac/ 1, is one that could just as easily be used for Malta; not that 
readily for any other onetime outpost of empire. 
31. First published in Britain by Gibraltar Books in 1995, it is subtitled "The 
Political Biography of Sir Joshua Hassan". 
